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Public Policy and Law Since Love Canal
Jon Cannon*
This article deals with what has happened since Love Canal
and what is going to happen in the future. It is fun to talk about the
future because, although people can debate you, nobody can prove
you are wrong. So I often choose the future as a topic and find that it
stimulates an interesting debate.
So what has happened since Love Canal? We have seen the
blossoming of a federal environmental structure. Superfund is a part
of that, certainly not the only part, and maybe not even the major part.
Other federal laws, like the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), deal with hazardous wastes before they become environ-
mental problems.
Since Love Canal, the history of the development of environ-
mental laws has been one of further elaboration and specification of
the applicable requirements. This process culminated with the 1990
Clean Air Act amendments, often described as the most complex
regulatory legislation ever adopted. So we have had a progression of
more elaborate federal statutes and greater specification or
prescriptiveness of the requirements that apply under these statutes.
While these statutes were developing and coming into their
full expression, there was also a growing concern that these statutes
were becoming too prescriptive, overly intrusive, and inefficient. Phil
Howard's book, The Death ofCommon Sense, captured this concern
about environmental statutes, as well as other federal regulatory
schemes.'
That resistance or resentment, if one can characterize it that
way, boiled over in the 104t Congress. Armed with the Contract with
America, the new Republican leadership in the House sought major
changes in the environmental regulatory regime as it then existed.
This included an effort to make cost benefit analysis the dominant
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strain in environmental regulation and to moderate existing legal
standards based predominately on health and environmental consider-
ations. This was opposed by the Clinton administration, and the con-
frontation came to a head with the budget crisis and the government
shut down early in 1996. By March 1996, the Republican majority
conceded it was fighting a losing battle. Public opinion was firm in
support of strong environmental regulations and standards. It was
politically unwise for Republicans to persist.
So it was then, just after this confrontation had ended that I
gave a lecture at Yale Law School on the future of environmental
programs. I offered a quite optimistic view which I characterized as
the "convergence hypothesis." The hypothesis was based on the idea
that the future of environmental law in this country would be one of
coming together around the issues, a convergence. What did I mean?
I did not mean there would be consensus on every issue. Issues would
still be debated. There would still be a diversity of views. However,
the terms of the debate were likely to be narrower or at least better
defined. There would be an increasing understanding, on all sides, of
the legitimacy and the importance of the issues involved, as well as
a broader acceptance of the framework within which those issues
would be resolved.
Now, two years later, in light of what has happened since, I
have an opportunity to again determine with you whether this is a
description of reality or just happy thinking. The convergence
hypothesis, as I expressed it, has three legs, like a three legged stool.
This suggests some stability, but if you kick one leg out, then you
have a problem. The three legs are: values, science, and re-invention.
Why values? One thing shown in the confrontation sur-
rounding the Contract with America was the public's overwhelming
preference for strong environmental protections. This preference
reflects consensus environmental values. Studies by anthropologists
have shown that there exists a set of beliefs that may be characterized
as environmentalism, and it is sufficiently widely held in this country
to constitute core cultural values. These common values shape our
preferences on environmental questions and narrow disagreements on
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particular environmental issues-although there is clearly plenty of
room left for those.
The second leg of the three-legged stool of convergence is
science. The more we know about issues, the less uncertainty we face.
Less uncertainty creates a more limited debate and a narrower set of
realistic options from which we make selections. That helps the
process of decision-making. Most importantly, reducing the level of
scientific uncertainty, as a result of additional scientific research,
makes it difficult for people arguing policy points to clothe those
points in terms of scientific debate or scientific uncertainty. The
grounds for disagreement are limited as scientific understanding
advances. Of course, science raises new issues as it goes-and new
controversies; there is no resting place. But scientific advance does
help to get some issues behind us, even as it unearths new ones.
The final leg of my three-legged stool is re-invention. The
notion is that continuing efforts to re-invent environmental regulation
will produce a benefit over time. These efforts will make environ-
mental programs more responsive, more efficient, and more effective.
They will do this because citizens or groups of citizens will demand
it oftheir elected representatives and their elected representatives will
demand it of agency officials. I don't suggest that this is an easy or
uncomplicated process, but as we understand more about how these
programs work and as we experiment with new regulatory
approaches, it isn't unreasonable to expect improvements along these
lines. With them we can expect even broader public support, not only
for the goals of environmental protection, but also for the means by
which those goals are achieved.
That is the hypothesis. You could raise a number of questions
regarding the validity of this hypothesis. I want to focus on one. That
is the question raised by the strength and persistence of deregulatory
pressures in the environmental arena and the reluctance, as in the case
of global climate change, to extend controls to emerging problems.
Environmental laws continue to be seen by many at least as excessively
rigid and inefficient. Yet we witness the expression of broad public
support for strong environmental standards, as in the debate in the 104"
Congress just discussed. What are we to make of this?
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I will try to answer that question. But first, I want to address
the Clinton administration's response to those pressures. The
administration has responded in several ways. First, it developed its
own re-invention programs to capture some of the energy generated
by this resistance and turn it to positive effect. For example, it made
administrative reforms in Superfund that have sped up the process
and reduced friction costs. These reforms have generally been
accepted as good.
The administration has also made efforts to develop market
approaches to environmental regulation, building on the successful
acid rain trading program in the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments. In
its new regional approach to ozone reduction in the eastern United
States, for example, EPA has proposed a regional plan and has invited
the states to develop a regional trading program to reduce the costs of
ozone reduction in that large region.
The Agency has also experimented with environmental
contracting, as in Project XL. Although probably the Agency's most
famous (or notorious, depending on your point of view) re-invention
initiative, XL is just one example of EPA's offer to work with
industry groups, industry sectors, or individual companies to reach
environmental results that are more cost-effective using a partnership
approach.
Finally, the Agency has focused on voluntary programs and
right-to-know programs, like the Toxic Release Inventory, which rely
on information to drive corporate behavior in environmentally
beneficial ways. The more the affected public knows about the quality
of its environment and impacts on its environment, the more effective
it is likely to be in communicating its desires through the political
process, through the market, and through direct communication with
company officials. A second type of agency response to deregulatory
pressure has been more reactive. The response has been simply to
back away from the implementation of some environmental measures
that have proven to be highly controversial. For example, there was
a requirement in the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments that in certain
ozone non-attainment areas employers of a certain size could be
required to submit plans for reducing vehicle use by their employees.
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It was unpopular among those affected by it, and there was resistence
to its implementation. The EPA said, "Wait a second. We're not
going to risk the Clean Air Act over this provision. We will simply
announce that we're not going to implement it." And the EPA did.
Congress later deleted the provision.
There was a similar problem with centralized inspections and
maintenance to deal with air emissions from cars, again under the
Clean Air Act. Inspection and maintenance programs are designed to
ensure that cars are running properly and the emissions control
devices are operating properly to reduce air emissions. The Agency,
following the terms of the Clean Air Act, imposed enhanced
inspection and maintenance programs in areas requiring centralized
test-only facilities. People were asked to drive their cars to those
central facilities. Once again, there was public resistance in the areas
affected. The EPA had to adjust accordingly, and has backed off its
insistence on having these facilities.
What does this mean-this scurrying to find less onerous
approaches, this backing off under pressure? Is it the kind of testing,
adjustment and refinement that one would hope for and would expect
to find in a healthy regulatory system? Or does it suggest some
underlying contradiction that signals weakness and instability?
Instead of real convergence around the issues, are we just trying to
have it both ways, steadfastly embracing environmental goals for
which-when we come right down to it-we are unwilling to pay?
Are we, as Richard Lazarus' has suggested, schizophrenic? My
answer is no-not necessarily. Clearly there is a tension between our
aspirations and our willingness to sacrifice to meet those aspirations,
but that tension is not inherently pathological and indeed can be
managed productively.
Professor Dwyer has explored the phenomenon of symbolic
environmental legislation-provisions that direct the Agency to set
controls at levels that Congress knows are not economically or
technically feasible and that Congress does not intend to be applied
as written. But Congress espouses these standards to take credit for
being environmental, while thrusting on the Agency and others the
difficulty of implementing them. This view of (some) environmental
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legislation is consistent with the schizophrenia diagnosis. To heal
ourselves, the message is, we should amend these standards to allow
EPA explicitly to consider cost and feasibility in its decisions. In
short, to stop kidding ourselves and adjust our goals.
Perhaps that would be good to do; for some standards-I
think of the Delaney clause-it has proved to be necessary. But,
except in unusual cases, it may require more than the political system
is capable of. And even without statutory changes, the Agency has
shown success, under some of its most unsparing legal mandates, in
managing the tension between our aspirations and real-world
constraints. The Clean Air Act includes a provision that governs the
setting of ambient air quality standards. This section requires that
EPA set ambient standards that protect human health and the
environment, with an adequate margin of safety and without regard
to cost or feasibility of implementation. In 1997, EPA revised the
ambient air standards for ozone and set new standards for fine
particulate matter. These standards will require tighter air emission
controls in many areas of the country, and they were vigorously
opposed by some industry and state and local interests and by
members of Congress responsive to those interests. The Agency did
not attempt to dilute the purity of the legal standard prohibiting
consideration of cost and feasibility; in fact, it insisted on preserving
that purity. At the same time, it adopted a plan for putting the new
ambient standards into effect that extended the schedule for
implementation and otherwise reduced the economic impact. This
plan was adopted by the President at the same time the new standards
were adopted. The standards showed strong support in the polls and
have withstood threats by some in Congress to overturn them.
This episode typifies the Agency's approach in the Clinton era,
defined by "strong adherence to environmental goals" and the use of
"flexibility" in the means to achieve those goals. How far can that be
taken? Regulation can always be improved, streamlined, and made
more cost-effective. In fact, one way of vindicating aspirational goals
is to refine compliance techniques so that what may seem to be
economically or technically infeasible becomes possible through
developments in technology and more cost-effective implementing
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measures. That's the re-invention leg of convergence that I talked about
earlier. But "flexibility" may also mean that the goals themselves are
being compromised-that we genuflect in their direction while
embracing policies that have no real chance to achieve them.
I was interested in the comments of Mr. Jennings earlier. He
said that environmental programs are a strategic asset for corpora-
tions, so we can expect more corporations to have environmental
programs because it is in their own interest to do so. However, he also
said that some sort of regulation seems inevitable and necessary.
At what point does flexibility undermine, rather than support,
environmental goals? If we cannot resolve to fully implement our
goals, shouldn't we admit that our goals are really less ambitious than
we might once have thought? These questions are difficult to answer
because the relationship between goals and implementation is not a
simple one. We are engaged in a constant dialectic between aspiration
and implementation, a constant testing of what we say we want in our
saintlier moments against what we are actually willing to pay for. I
think this dialectic will continue to be played out with a lot of energy
in the coming years. But the field over which that dialectic plays will
be limited by the factors I mentioned earlier-values, science and re-
invention.
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